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Abstract
State-of-the-art adversarial attacks are aimed at neural
network classifiers. By default, neural networks use gra-
dient descent to minimize their loss function. The gradi-
ent of a classifier’s loss function is used by gradient-based
adversarial attacks to generate adversarially perturbed im-
ages. We pose the question whether another type of op-
timization could give neural network classifiers an edge.
Here, we introduce a novel approach that uses minimax op-
timization to foil gradient-based adversarial attacks. Our
minimax classifier is the discriminator of a generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) [15] that plays a minimax game
with the GAN generator. In addition, our GAN generator
projects all points onto a manifold that is different from
the original manifold since the original manifold might
be the cause of adversarial attacks. To measure the per-
formance of our minimax defense, we use adversarial at-
tacks - Carlini Wagner (CW) [7], DeepFool [27], Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16] - on three datasets:
MNIST [21], CIFAR-10 [17] and German Traffic Sign
(TRAFFIC) [40]. Against CW attacks, our minimax de-
fense achieves 98.07% (MNIST-default 98.93%), 73.90%
(CIFAR-10-default 83.14%) and 94.54% (TRAFFIC-default
96.97%). Against DeepFool attacks, our minimax de-
fense achieves 98.87% (MNIST), 76.61% (CIFAR-10) and
94.57% (TRAFFIC). Against FGSM attacks, we achieve
97.01% (MNIST), 76.79% (CIFAR-10) and 81.41% (TRAF-
FIC). Our Minimax adversarial approach presents a signif-
icant shift in defense strategy for neural network classifiers.
1. Introduction
Machine learning classifying algorithms are suscepti-
ble to misclassification of adversarially and imperceptably
perturbed inputs that are called adversarial samples. The
misclassification of adversarial samples has been shown
to transfer not only among diverse neural network clas-
sifiers [41, 3], but also to many other types of classi-
fiers [41, 16, 35, 43], such as logistic regression, support
vector machines, decision trees, nearest neighbors, and en-
semble classifiers. One common defense against adversarial
attacks on various types of classifiers is adversarial train-
ing [18, 41, 16, 42], which augments the training data with
adversarial samples. The increasing deployment of machine
learning classifiers in security and safety-critical domains
such as traffic signs [12], autonomous driving [1], health-
care [13], and malware detection [10] makes countering ad-
versarial attacks important.
The field of adversarial attacks and defenses is dom-
inated by gradient-based approaches, since gradient de-
scent [20, 19] is used for optimizing neural networks. State-
of-the-art adversarial attacks use the gradient of the loss
function in white-box, gradient-based attacks. Such attack
methods include CW [7], DeepFool [27], FGSM [16], the
Jacobian-based Saliency Map (JSMA) [33], the Basic Iter-
ative Method (BIM) [18], ZOO [8], the Projected Gradient
Descent attack (PGD) [23]. Defensive approaches against
these gradient-based attacks try to mask the gradients in
different ways. Defensive distillation [34] does this implic-
itly, but not always successfully [4]. Other defense methods
use saturated non-linearities [28] or non-differential classi-
fiers [22] to mask gradients. However, masked and obfus-
cated gradients have been successfully circumvented, either
by approximation of the gradient [2], or by using the gradi-
ents of another classifier [32] based on adversarial transfer-
ability [35] across classifiers. The same gradient approach
can also be used to circumvent defenses that use subnet-
works to identify adversarial samples implicitly [24] or ex-
plicitly [25]. Therefore, gradient-based approaches are not
an effective defense for against adversarial attacks.
Minimax optimization by GANs has been shown [11] to
reach limit points not reachable by gradient descent opti-
mization. Whereas gradient descent [20] aims to minimize
a classifier’s loss function, a GAN is a minimax, two-player
game between two agents, the generator and discrimina-
tor [15]. By ending up in an unreachable optimization point,
a classifier that is playing a minimax game in a GAN could
be able to fool gradient-based, adversarial attacks.
Many adversarial defenses aim to preserve the original
manifold and probability distribution by projecting adver-
sarial points onto the input manifold of images. In Defense-
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Figure 1. We show that original and adversarial images are projected onto a reshaped manifold, not the original one. Notice how our
Minimax projections differ from the original dataset images: they are more blurry in the background and in details that do not matter for
classification, for example the feathers on the bird or the window detail of the truck. Other details get highlighted. For example, the shapes
of traffic signs and the signs and letters on them, the white color of the horse seems more prominent, the inside of the sign with 50 on it.
For these results, our Minimax GAN has been trained only with the original training dataset, no adversarial training.
GAN [37], after random initializations in the latent space of
a GAN, the closest match for the adversary image is chosen.
Both MagNet [24] and Ape-GAN [38] use autoencoders
to move adversarial samples towards the original manifold.
PixelDefend by Song et al. [39] generates several similar
images, then choses those with highest probability within
a distance from an image. However, the original manifold
of data points can be the cause of adversarial attacks. Low
probability regions of the distribution have been attributed
for the susceptibility to adversarial attacks by Szegedy et
al. [41], Song et al. [39] and Trame`r et al. [43]. Further-
more, adversarial attack samples have been found to be
transferable to not only other deep learning classifiers of
different architectures and parameters, but also to very di-
verse types of classifiers [35], such as logistic regression,
support vector machines, decision trees, nearest neighbors,
and ensemble classifiers. Such diverse classifiers have only
one thing in common, the dataset, which determines the
data manifold and the probability distribution. When the
dataset is indeed the cause of adversarial attacks, then ad-
hering to and maintaining the original probability distribu-
tion and manifold could be incorrect. Figure 1 and Figure 2
show that Minimax GAN generator does not project the im-
ages onto the original manifold.
In this paper, we present a novel defense method against
state-of-the-art gradient-based adversarial attacks with two
combined approaches. Based on minimax optimization in
GANs, the first, novel approach counters the assumption of
gradient-based attacks that neural network classifiers per-
form gradient descent optimization. The second approach
reshapes the original manifold based on the transferability
of adversarial attacks across classifiers, which points to the
dataset and its manifold as the cause of adversarial attacks.
The major contributions of this paper are:
• A novel Minimax defense against adversarial attacks
that defends from state-of-the-art gradient-based at-
tacks.
• We identify current attacks as being gradient-based, on
which Minimax defense is based.
• Against state-of-the-art attacks, we achieve accuracy
comparable to that of non-adversarial samples.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first GAN
minimax approach against adversarial attacks.
2. Related work
Minimax versus adversarial training. A study on the
convergence properties of gradient-based methods in mini-
max problems [11] has focused on their limit points, asking
the question whether gradient descent methods converge to
local minimax solutions. Their conclusion is that they fail
to do so. This has implications for adversarial attacks and
defenses, because following in this section, we will show
that all current adversarial attacks are gradient-based.
Further, we discuss adversarial attacks and defenses and
provide summaries. We show that all attacks are gradient-
based and that current defenses are overcome by the attacks.
2.1. Adversarial attacks
Here, we detail state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
CW is formulated as a constrained optimization prob-
lem [7]:
minimize ‖xadv − x0‖22 + c · lossf (xadv, l)
subject to xadv ∈ [0, 1]n,
(1)
where f is the classification function, l is an adversary tar-
get label. With a change of variable, CW obtains an uncon-
strained minimization problem that allows it to do optimiza-
tion through backpropagation. CW has three attacks that
use the same optimization framework as in Equation 1, but
are based on different norms: L0, L2 and L∞ attacks. CW
is a gradient-based attack because it uses back-propagation
on the classifier neural network.
The DeepFool attack [27] looks at the distance of a
point from the classifier decision boundary as the minimum
amount of perturbation needed to change its classification.
To estimate this distance, DeepFool approximates the clas-
sifier with a linear one, and then estimates the distance of
the point from the linear boundary. After determining the
minimum distance from all boundaries, DeepFool takes a
step in the direction of the closest boundary. This is re-
peated until DeepFool finds an adversarial sample. Deep-
Fool uses the derivative of the affine approximation of the
classifier, therefore Deepfool is a gradient-based method.
The FGSM attack [16] uses the gradient of a classifier’s
loss function with respect to the input image. FGSM per-
turbs each input dimension in the direction of the gradient
by a magnitude of . For model θ, with loss J(θ, x, y), x an
input image and y its label, adversarial images are obtained:
xadv = x+ sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)). (2)
FGSM is a gradient-based method, because it uses the
derivative. FGSM is a one-step method, its iterative version
is the Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [18].
The BIM attack [18] extends the FGSM attack [16] by
applying iteratively with a smaller step α. After each step,
pixels are clipped to keep adversarial image within  neigh-
borhood of the image. As an extension of the FGSM attack,
the BIM attack is also gradient-based.
The JSMA attack [33] is a greedy algorithm using the
classifier gradient to compute a saliency map. which makes
JSMA a gradient-based attack. The saliency map embodies
the effect of pixels on classification. JSMA goes through
the pixels in saliency-decreasing order and changes them.
If misclassification is achieved the iterations are stopped.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAP) seeks to
find a universal perturbation that can cause misclassification
of most points in the dataset [26]. UAP iterates over the
images, calculating for each the minimal perturbation that
causes that image to move to the classifier boundary. UAP
aggregates all these perturbations. Several iterations over
the X data points are performed and the universal perturba-
tion is centered at 0 and its norm constrained. UAP uses the
same approach as DeepFool to calculate the minimum per-
turbation for an image. Since DeepFool is a gradient-based
attack, UAP also is gradient-based.
Summary of adversarial attacks. All state-of-the-art
adversarial attacks are gradient-based. They exploit the
gradients of neural network classifiers to perform optimiza-
tion that creates adversarial samples. This opens up the op-
portunity for defending from all adversarial attacks by tar-
geting the gradients that they relie on. CW and DeepFool
are considered the strongest state-of-the-art attacks.
2.2. Adversarial defenses
Following are examples and details of several techniques
used for defending against adversarial attacks.
Adversarial training. In adversarial training, the
dataset is augmented with adversarial samples, often of the
same kind as the attack, and the classifier is retrained [18].
Adversarial training augments the dataset by filling out low-
probability gaps with additional data points and then re-
training the classifier to find a better boundary. The benefit
of adversarial training is that it is easy to use and improves
defense when attack is known. The drawback is that it only
works against the attack that was used to generate the ad-
versarial samples, not against others.
Identification or projection of adversary samples on
the original manifold. MagNet by Meng et al. [24] identi-
fies adversarial samples and moves them towards the orig-
inal manifold using an autoencoder or a collection of au-
toencoders. It contains several detector networks that de-
tect adversarial examples from the distance between the
original image and the reconstructed image. The reformer
network moves adversarial samples towards the manifold.
MagNet is the closest defence to our Minimax defense, but
it cannot be used as a baseline for it because it has been
shown [6] that a small custimization of the CW attack over-
comes MagNet.
Defense-GAN by Samangouei et al. [37] which uses a
GAN with a generator to project adversarial points onto the
manifold of natural images. Given an input point that is
potentially adversarial, Defense-GAN does several random
initializations in the latent space and chooses from them a
latent space seed that generates the closest match to the in-
put. The closest match is considered as the projection of
the original input point, though due to the randomness and
depending on the number of random initializations, this pro-
jection might end up far from the real projection of the point
on the manifold. Defense-GAN uses a classifier to which
GAN input or GAN output or both GAN input and GAN
output data points are used.
PixelDefend by Song et al. [39] proposes generative
models to move adversarial images towards the distribution
seen in the data. PixelDefend identifies adversarial samples
with statistical methods (p-value) and finds more probable
samples by generating similar images with an optimization
that uses gradient descent, looking for highest probability
images within a distance.
APE-GAN [38] trains a pre-processing network to
project normal as well as adversarial data points onto the
original manifold using a GAN.
Gradient masking and obfuscation. Defensive Distil-
lation (DD) [34] is based on distillation - a knowledge trans-
fer method. DD aims to provide resilience by reducing the
amplitude of gradients of the loss function which are used
by gradient-based attacks. DD trains a teacher network and
calculates the output based on the output of the layer be-
fore the softmax layer divided by a temperature parameter
T. Then, DD generates soft labels for the training dataset by
running the dataset through the teacher network. The soft
labels are used for training the distilled network and reduce
overfitting of the original dataset.
Summary. Unlike adversarial training, both other de-
fenses have been overcome by gradient-based attacks.
The approach of identification or projection of adversar-
ial samples onto the original manifold has been successfully
attacked. Identification [5] and projection on original man-
ifold [6] have been shown to be vulnerable to CW. The rea-
son is that these defenses use neural networks to identify
and to project points, and neural networks use gradient de-
scent, which is exploited by gradient-based attacks.
Gradient masking and obfuscation has also been over-
come by the CW attack [4]. CW attacks the DD by changing
the inputs to the final layer to avoid vanishing gradients [4].
More generally, masked and or obfuscated gradients can be
overcome due to transferability. An attack can create an-
other classifier, train it on hard labels if available, or soft if
not, and use the gradients of the new classifier for attack.
Due to the transferability of adversarial attacks, adversar-
ial attacks from the new classifier will likely transfer to the
original defense.
3. Our approach: Minimax adversarial de-
fense
Our Minimax adversarial defense is a generic defense
against adversarial attacks that does not identify adversarial
points explicitly and does not necessitate adversarial train-
ing but can benefit from it. Figure 2 shows image projec-
tions using the GAN generator.
Minimax defense counters state-of-the-art, gradient-
based adversarial attacks by doing minimax optimization
with a GAN discriminator. Our Minimax classifier is a
GAN discriminator where the Real and Fake labels have
been specialized to incorporate the classification labels. The
presence of the dataset labels in the discriminator reshapes
the original manifold to a different manifold. As a result,
the generator projects images onto the reshaped manifold.
What causes adversarial attacks? It is commonly ac-
cepted that the data points of natural image datasets oc-
cupy low-dimensional manifolds in high-dimensional input
space [14]. Manifolds are defined as collections of points
in the input space that are connected. Many adversarial de-
fense methods aim to preserve the original manifold and
to project adversarial data points onto it. For example,
Defense-GAN [37] finds close matches of adversary im-
ages on the manifold and chooses the closest. MagNet [24]
and Ape-GAN [38] move points onto the original manifold
with autoencoder and GAN autoencoder generator respec-
tively. PixelDefend by Song et al. [39] chooses a substi-
tute for an adversarial image by generating several sim-
ilar images, then choosing those with highest probability
within a distance from the adversary image. We argue that
the adversarial transferability across very different classi-
fiers [35] means that the dataset and its manifold shape are
the cause, specifically low probability regions of the distri-
bution [41, 39, 43]. Furthermore, adversarial attack sam-
ples have been found to be transferable to not only other
deep learning classifiers of different architectures and pa-
rameters, but also to very diverse types of classifiers [35],
such as logistic regression, support vector machines, de-
cision trees, nearest neighbors, and ensemble classifiers.
Such diverse classifiers have only one thing in common, the
dataset, which determines the data manifold and the proba-
bility distribution. Therefore, to counter adversarial attacks,
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Figure 2. We show that MNIST and TRAFFIC images are projected on a reshaped manifold by our Minimax defense. For comparison,
original images and their projections are included as well. CW and FGSM attacks are used. Notice how our Minimax projections differ
from the original dataset images whether they are original images or adversary. It can be seen in the TRAFFIC images that projected
images are more blurry in the background. It appears that the numbers in MNIST images and the sign details get emphasized. In the
MNIST images, we can also see that the shape of the projected digits is not exactly the same as the original image. For example, digit 3
loses the little turn at the top left. Therefore, the manifold is not the same as the original one.
the manifold needs to be reshaped and not preserved.
Figure 3 depicts our view that low probability regions
cause adversarial attacks [41, 39, 43]. The boundaries of
different types of classifiers overlap each-other, as sup-
ported by adversarial transferability. As all classifiers aim
to keep same distances from different dataset classes, gaps
in the manifold cause the boundaries to be shifted. Shifted
boundaries create areas in which images will misclassify
due to the shift.
GAN choice To reshape manifolds, autoencoders are fre-
quently used, either on their own [24] as in MagNet [24],
or as part of a GAN with an autoencoder generator [44].
We choose to use a GAN in our approach because GANs
have been shown to be very good at reconstructing mani-
folds of natural image datasets in original high-dimensional
input spaces [15]. In distinction to other methods that also
use GANs against adversarial attacks, our Minimax genera-
tor is an autoencoder because it enables direct projection of
images onto the reshaped manifold. The inclusion of class
labels into Real and Fake labels of our Minimax discrimi-
nator allows our defense to reshape the manifold even in the
absence of adversarial samples in training.
Multi-label GAN discriminator in Minimax adver-
sarial defense. In Minimax defense, we combine and ex-
tend these GAN variations [30, 36]. We combine them by
having the GAN discriminator act as a classifier and extend
them by having K labels for each Real and Fake category
of labels. As a result, a Minimax discriminator has twice
the number of labels in the dataset, in all 2×K labels.
How our approach differs from similar defenses. The
defenses that are most similar to Minimax defense, Mag-
Net [24] and Defense-GAN [37], are essentially differ-
ent from Minimax in that they do not deply the minimax
defense. MagNet [24] and Defense-GAN [37] reposition
their sample points with autoencoders/GANs and then clas-
sify the repositioned points on a separate classifier. Our
Minimax defense uses the GAN discriminator as classifier,
does not perform gradient descent. Instead, the descrimina-
tor/classifier is involved in a minimax game with the GAN
generator, which leads it to different optimization solutions
than gradient descent. This is the crucial difference from
MagNet [24] and Defense-GAN [37].
Labels. The original GAN definition [15] specified two
discriminator labels: Real, Fake. Our Minimax defense
further breaks down these labels into the classes of the clas-
sification problem. If the original classification problem has
K classes, our Minimax defense discriminator has 2 × K
classes. For example, for MNIST, the discriminator labels
are: Real − 0, Fake − 0, Real − 1, FAKE − 1, . . . ,
REAL− 9 and FAKE − 9; 20 labels in total.
Perfect
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Various
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Adversarial
perturbation 
Figure 3. We illustrate our understanding of how manifold gaps
cause adversarial attacks for a simple case of classification of dig-
its 3 and 7. There is a small gap in the lower manifold that lacks
data points from the square class. Classifiers aim to maintain same
distance from points of different classes. This causes them to pass
roughly in the same region of space. Due to the manifold gap, all
classifiers shift towards the gap to maintain same distance from
points of different classes. As a result, in the vicinity of the gap,
all classifiers are surrounded by space the points of which would
belong to one of the classes. They all misclassify the data points
shown as adversarial samples, which are between the classifiers
and the perfect boundary.
Loss function. The Minimax GAN loss function is:
L =
9∑
i=0
Ex∼ pdata(x)|yi [logD(x)]+
+
19∑
i=10
Ex∼ pdata(x)|yi [1− logD(G(x))]. (3)
The term logD(G(x)) reflects the usage of an autoen-
coder as the generator, where the input is dataset images.
Minimax defense architecture. Our novel Minimax de-
fense against adversarial attacks is a GAN. The generator of
this GAN is an autoencoder that takes images as input and
outputs images. In addition to the Real and Fake labels of
a GAN discriminator, we have added the class labels to the
discriminator. As a result, the number of labels in the dis-
criminator is twice the number of labels in the dataset. The
architecture of our Minimax GAN is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 also shows how an image in a digit binary clas-
sification problem (3 and 7 for simplicity) gets classified by
Minimax defense. First, the image goes through the gener-
ator and then through the discriminator. The probability of
MNIST CIFAR TRAFFIC
Conv.R 3x3x32 Conv.E 3x3x32 Conv.R 3x3x32
BatchNorm BatchNorm BatchNorm
Conv.R 3x3x64 Conv.E 3x3x32 Conv.R 3x3x32
BatchNorm BatchNorm BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 MaxPool 2x2 MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.25 Dropout 0.2 Dropout 0.2
Dense 128 Conv.E 3x3x64 Conv.R 3x3x64
Dropout 0.5 BatchNorm BatchNorm
Dense.Soft 20 Conv.E 3x3x64 Conv.R 3x3x64
BatchNorm BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.3 Dropout 0.2
Conv.E 3x3x128 Conv.R 3x3x128
BatchNorm BatchNorm
Conv.E 3x3x64 Conv.R 3x3x128
BatchNorm BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 MaxPool 2x2
Dropout 0.4 Dropout 0.2
Dense.Soft 20 Dense 512
BatchNorm
Dropout 0.5
Dense.Soft 20
Table 1. Discriminator architecture for MNIST, CIFAR and
TRAFFIC datasets.
the input image being, for example, digit 3 is the sum of the
probabilities of labels Real − 3 and Fake− 3.
GAN Discriminators The discriminators for all three
datasets have convolutional layers, batch-normalization lay-
ers, max-pooling, drop-out layers. They all use regulariza-
tion and SGD optimization. The architecture of all three
discriminators is shown in Table 1.
GAN Generators. The generators for all three datasets
have convolutional layers, batch-normalization layers, max-
pooling, drop-out layers. The final layer is a convolutional
layer with sigmoid activation. They all use regularization
and Adadelta optimization. The architecture of all three
generators is shown in Table 2.
4. Experiments and Results
To evaluate our Minimax defense method, it is impor-
tant to show that the accuracy of adversarial samples with
Minimax is comparable to the accuracy of non-adversarial
samples with a default classifier. We present the results first
followed by the details for obtaining them.
Results of Minimax defense evaluation. Our results in
Table 3 show that our Minimax adversarial defense main-
tains very high accuracy for the MNIST dataset, with values
very close to the accuracy of the default classifier trained
and tested on the original MNIST dataset - 98.93%.
Evaluating our Minimax adversarial defense on CIFAR-
Input	Images
in	Original
Manifold
Images	in
Reshaped
Manifold
DiscriminatorAutoencoder
/	Generator
Encoder Decoder
True	3
False	3
True	7
False	7
3
7
Probabilities
Figure 4. Here, we show an overview of the transformations that images go through in Minimax defense. First, it gets projected on the
reshaped manifold by going through the generator. Second, the projected image is classified by the discriminator, where the probability for
each label is calculated as the sum of the true and false probabilities for that label.
MNIST CIFAR TRAFFIC
Conv.R 3x3x32 Conv.R 3x3x64 Conv.R 3x3x32
BatchNorm BatchNorm BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 Conv.R 3x3x64 MaxPool 2x2
Conv.R 3x3x32 BatchNorm Conv 3x3x32
BatchNorm MaxPool 2x2 BatchNorm
MaxPool 2x2 Conv.R 3x3x128 MaxPool 2x2
Conv.R 3x3x32 BatchNorm Dropout 0.2
BatchNorm Conv.R 3x3x128 Conv.R 3x3x32
Upsampling 2x2 BatchNorm BatchNorm
Conv.R 3x3x32 MaxPool 2x2 Upsampling 2x2
BatchNorm Upsampling 2x2 Conv 3x3x32
Upsampling 2x2 Conv.R 3x3x128 BatchNorm
Conv.Sig 3x3x1 BatchNorm Upsampling 2x2
Upsampling 2x2 Dropout 0.2
Conv.R 3x3x64 Conv.Sig 3x3x3
BatchNorm
Conv.Sig 3x3x3
Table 2. Generator architecture for MNIST, CIFAR and TRAFFIC
datasets.
MNIST Default Accuracy 98.93%
Attack Parameter No Minimax
Defense Defense
FGSM  = 0.1 81.18% 97.01%
CW L2 conf = 40 0.79% 97.50%
CW L2 conf = 0 0.84% 98.07%
DeepFool 1.12% 98.87%
Table 3. Comparison of MNIST dataset classification accuracy for
no defense and for Minimax defense. MNIST default accuracy is
at the top of the table.
10, our results in Table 4 show that the Minimax accuracy
for the CIFAR-10 dataset remains very close to the accuracy
of the default classifier trained and tested on the original
CIFAR-10 dataset - 83.14%.
We evaluate our Minimax adversarial defense on TRAF-
FIC and find, based on in Table 5, that the accuracy of
CIFAR Default Accuracy 83.14%
Attack Parameter No Minimax
Defense Defense
FGSM  = 0.1 10.28% 76.79%
CW L2 conf = 40 8.82% 69.73%
CW L2 conf = 0 8.73% 73.90%
DeepFool 8.99% 76.61%
Table 4. We compare CIFAR-10 dataset classification accuracy for
no defense and for Minimax defense. Adversarial training was
used for the results in italics.
our Minimax adversarial defense for the TRAFFIC dataset
remains very close to the accuracy of the default classi-
fier trained and tested on the original TRAFFIC dataset -
96.97%.
TRAFFIC-32x32 Default Accuracy 96.97%
Attack Parameter No Minimax
Defense Defense
FGSM  = 0.1 28.74% 81.41%
CW L2 conf = 40 1.56% 94.54%
CW L2 conf = 0 1.41% 93.66%
DeepFool 1.43% 94.57%
Table 5. We compare classification accuracy for the TRAFFIC
dataset for no defense and for Minimax defense. Adversarial
training was used for the results in italics.
Comparison with MagNet. The MagNet method has
been shown [6] to not withstand customized CW attacks.
Nevertheless, we compare the two approaches to provide
context for our results since they both use autoencoders.
MagNet [24] is tested against very small perturbations
for FGSM attack on MNIST dataset - up to  = 0.01,
whereas we show Minimax withstands attacks of very high
perturbations, up to  = 0.3, shown here in Table 6.
Attacks. We generate adversarial samples with Clev-
erHans 3.0.1 [31] for the FGSM, CW L2 and DeepFool
attacks and the IBM Adversarial Robustness 360 Toolbox
(ART) toolbox [29] for the JSMA attack. We evaluate
Comparison to MagNet for MNIST
Attack Minimax / No MagNet / No
defense / attack Defense / attack
FGSM  = 0.3 86.72% / 98.93% *0.13% / 99.4%
FGSM  = 0.2 98.52% / 98.93% NA
FGSM  = 0.1 98.52% / 98.93% NA
FGSM  = 0.01 98.52% / 98.93% 100.00% / 99.4%
CW L2 97.50% / 98.93% 99.50% / 99.4%
conf = 40
CW L2 98.07% / 98.93% 99.50% / 99.4%
conf = 0
DeepFool 98.87% / 98.93% 99.40% / 99.4%
Table 6. Comparison of Minimax defense results to MagNet re-
sults. The Magnet results are obtained from the Magnet paper [24]
with the exception of entries marked with *, which were averaged
from comparison results from the Defense-GAN [37] paper.
against three types of white-box attacks: CW [7], Deep-
Fool [27] and FGSM [16]. We choose CW [7] and Deep-
Fool [27] because they are state-of-the-art, and FGSM [16]
because it is one of the first identified attacks. Minimax is
written in Python 3.5.2, using Keras 2.2.4 [9].
Baselines. To calculate a baseline in the absence of ad-
versarial attack, we trained classifiers with identical models
as our Minimax discriminators, except for the number of
output labels in the last softmax layer. The baselines in the
absence of adversarial attack are: for MNIST 98.93%, for
CIFAR-10 83.14%, for TRAFFIC 96.97%.
Datasets We evaluate our Minimax adversarial defense
on three datasets - MNIST [21], CIFAR-10 [17] and TRAF-
FIC [40]. The MNIST dataset [21] is a dataset of hand-
written digits with ten classes of size 28× 28× 1. MNIST
has 60K training samples and 10K testing samples. The
CIFAR-10 dataset [17] is a 10-class dataset of objects, with
images of size 32 × 32 × 3. The sizes of the CIFAR-10
training and testing datasets are 50K and 10K. The TRAF-
FIC dataset [40] is a dataset of 43 classes of images of traffic
signs in different sizes, from 15× 15× 3 to 250× 250× 3
pixels. We rescale the images to 32× 32× 3 the same size
as CIFAR-10 images. The TRAFFIC training and testing
datasets have respectively 39209 and 12630 samples.
Discriminator and generator architectures. The
model architecture of all discriminators is shown in Table 1,
the model architecture of all autoencoders is shown in Ta-
ble 2.
Optimizers. For classification of the MNIST dataset,
we use an Adadelta optimizer for the discriminator, clas-
sifier and generator; and SGD for the adversarial model.
For CIFAR-10, we use RMSprop for the discriminator and
classifier; Adadelta for the generator; and SGD for the ad-
versarial model. For the TRAFFIC dataset, we use SGD for
the discriminator and classifer; Adadelta for the generator;
SGD for the adversarial model.
Training. We use L2 kernel regularization in the convo-
lutional layers of the discriminators, classifiers, and gener-
ators for the classification of all three datasets. We do not
perform image augmentation in the training of any of the
datasets. The batches are chosen randomly. The training
is done in random batches of 32 images for MNIST and
TRAFFIC, and 128 images for CIFAR-10. The number of
epochs is 10 for MNIST, TRAFFIC, and 64 for CIFAR-
10. We conduct experiments with and without adversarial
training. For adversarial training, we enhance the training
dataset with adversarial samples of the same type as the the
attack. During training, the training adversarial samples are
refreshed after 60 batches.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that all state-of-the-art
attacks were gradient-based and that our Minimax de-
fense countered state-of-the-art adversarial attacks against
neural-network classifiers. This was done without mask-
ing gradients which has been shown to be an ineffec-
tive defense. Since all state-of-the-art gradient attacks
are gradient-based, minimax defends against all of them.
Our novel Minimax defense has combined a minimax ap-
proach against gradient-based attacks with an approach
that reshapes the manifold for better classification. Our
results showed that Minimax defense countered gradient-
based attacks for three diverse datasets. For CW at-
tacks, Minimax defense achieved 98.07% (MNIST-default
98.93%), 73.90% (CIFAR-10-default 83.14%) and 94.54%
(TRAFFIC-default 96.97%). Against DeepFool attacks,
our minimax defense achieves 98.87% (MNIST), 76.61%
(CIFAR-10) and 94.57% (TRAFFIC). These results show
that Minimax maintains accuracy for adversarial samples.
We have also demonstrated using the TRAFFIC dataset
in adversarial attacks and our Minimax defense. The
TRAFFIC dataset could be a replacement for CIFAR-10 in
adversarial methods. Though CIFAR-10 is commonly used
for adversarial attacks and defenses, it needs many epochs
to converge.
In conclusion, we have identified gradient descent as an
underlying crucial aspect of current attacks, which has lead
to our Minimax defense that does not mask its gradients but
is still able to counter state-of-the-art attacks.
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